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Think Another Time: Rosa Luxemburg and the Concept of History 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This essay considers the significance of Rosa Luxemburg’s thought in relation to discourses on the 
materialist conception of history. Luxemburg engaged extensively with Marx’s method in order to 
understand the consequences of capitalism and socialism as a concrete possibility. In The 
Accumulation of Capital (1913), she deals with the problem of economic reproduction and the 
material conditions for the global expansion of capital. Yet, her writings have sparked a long tradition 
of debate concerning her contribution to Marxist theory. Within this tradition, Michael Löwy and 
Norman Geras have discussed Luxemburg’s idea of history, giving divergent interpretations of her 
influential phrase, ‘socialism or barbarism.’ Building on the key terms of their argument, this essay 
proposes to read The Accumulation of Capital as compelling reflection on the contingency of 
capitalism. Luxemburg’s analysis of the drive to accumulation shows capitalism’s manipulation of the 
process of social transmission and urges a re-appropriation of history against capitalism’s teleology of 
perpetual expansion. 
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In a recent essay titled ‘Woman on the Verge of Revolution,’ Jacqueline Rose writes that ‘if Rosa 
Luxemburg has become a heroine for our times, it is also because her revolutionary moment, spawned 
in those first decades of the twentieth century, now echoes with our own.’1 Written after the 2011 
uprising in North Africa and the Middle East, Rose’s remarks testify to the fact that almost a century 
after her death, Rosa Luxemburg is perceived as a part of the present, a heroine for our times. The act 
of declaring ‘Red Rosa’ our contemporary, however, not only involves reflecting on the currency of 
her legacy. It is not just a matter of showing the relevance, say, of Luxemburg’s thoughts on mass 
strike in an age of global social movements of protest. As Hannah Arendt wrote in her 1966 essay, 
thinking Rosa Luxemburg in the present means to challenge the perception of ‘Red Rosa’ as a mere 
‘symbol of nostalgia for the good old times;’2 it means asking a crucial question: ‘will history look 
different if seen through the prism of her life and work?’3 The question, in other words, does not 
concern how best to update Luxemburg for the twenty-first century, but how to rethink the meaning of 
our times through the transmission of her life and legacy. Rosa Luxemburg is not just heritage for 
nostalgic recollection or a usable past that can be subject to adaptation. Her thought needs to become 
a ‘prism’ through which the present can be radically reinterpreted.4 
For this reason, addressing Rosa Luxemburg as a heroine for our times entails reimagining the 
meaning of history, the relation between past and present and, most importantly, the ways in which 
the past can be transmitted into the present. It means, as Arendt explains, not treating history ‘as the 
inevitable background of a famous person’s life span’ but rather ‘as though the colourless light of 
historical time were forced through and refracted by the prism of a great character so that in the 
resulting spectrum a complete unity of life and world is achieved.’5 Arendt’s image of the prism 
suggests that revisiting the past can radically change the way the present is being seen. And it should 
be noted that Luxemburg wrote compelling meditations on the problem of history and the meaning of 
transmitting the past as a tool to critique the present. Not only did she examine these problems in her 
‘Junius Pamphlet,’ written a century ago at the beginning of World War I. She also provided inspiring 
reflections on historical time in her masterpiece, The Accumulation of Capital, by applying Marx’s 
dialectical method to understanding capitalism’s historical conditions. This essay will explore how the 
very concepts of history and historical transmission can be thought otherwise, starting from 
Luxemburg’s ‘Junius Pamphlet’ and proceeding to interrogate the tradition of debate to which this 
pamphlet has given rise. My reflections will conclude by contributing to these debates through a 
reading of The Accumulation of Capital. Rosa Luxemburg’s concept of history, indeed, needs to be 
linked to a conscious intervention aimed at reclaiming historical transmission from capital’s 
manipulations of time. Reassessing the relevance of Rosa Luxemburg for our times involves 
addressing the political and theoretical implications of thinking the concept of history through her 
writings.  
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1. The Question of History 
 
Luxemburg examined the concept of history in what is known as the ‘Junius Pamphlet,’ an essay 
titled ‘The Crisis in the German Social Democracy’ (1915), written while in prison for her opposition 
to World War I. The pamphlet expresses her disappointment at the capitulation of the German Social 
Democratic Party through its vote in favour of the war in 1914. The Party, at the time the largest 
socialist organisation worldwide, betrayed the principle of international class solidarity advocated by 
the Second International by choosing to defend the German ‘fatherland.’ As Mary-Alice Waters notes, 
‘August 4, 1914, has long been recognised as one of the most ignominious dates in the history of the 
international socialist movement.’6 This historical circumstance urged Luxemburg to reflect on the 
meaning of the events within the historical course of the early twentieth century. In her essay, 
Luxemburg writes that men ‘do not make history according to their own free will. But they make 
history nonetheless,’ paraphrasing an influential passage of Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte.7 The action of the oppressed classes is ‘dependent upon the degree of maturity in social 
development. However, social development is not independent of the proletariat but is equally its 
driving force and cause, its effect and consequence.’8 Luxemburg pointed out that historical events 
cannot be solely explained by objective laws because they are the products of human action and 
consciousness. Hence the working class carries a special historical responsibility: objective conditions 
can and need to be changed by the action and consciousness of the proletariat; in 1915, this meant to 
reinstate class solidarity and to prevent the descent into the imperialist war. Luxemburg claims that 
‘social development’ is, at the same time, cause and effect, driving force and consequence, of the 
action of the working class.9 As Georg Lukacs remarks, Rosa Luxemburg grasped that the proletariat 
is ‘then, at one and the same time the product of the permanent crisis in capitalism and the instrument 
of those tendencies which drive capitalism towards crisis . . . But the class consciousness of the 
proletariat . . . does not advance according to mechanical “laws”.’10 
In order to understand fully the conceptual issue opened through these remarks, Luxemburg’s 
thoughts need to be linked to their source. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx 
revealed the problematic link between agency and historical determination by stating that ‘men make 
their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the 
past.’11 This suggests that the making of history – that is, agency – cannot be detached from 
circumstances that are ‘transmitted from the past.’ Human beings are free to intervene and change 
social reality, but they can only do so from the situation in which they find themselves, which they 
have not produced of their own. History is in the making through a process of transmission and 
determination.12 The Eighteenth Brumaire was written in 1852, but already in 1845, in his theses 
‘Concerning Feuerbach,’ Marx had started to engage with this problem by exposing the limits of 
Ludwig Feuerbach’s contemplative materialist philosophy, which sees reality or ‘sensuousness’ as a 
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mere object of knowledge. In contrast with a contemplative version of materialism, Marx argued that 
‘the thing, reality, sensuousness’ should not be seen as a static, passive object, but rather as a sensuous 
‘human activity, practice’.13 Historical materialism shows that even those historical conditions that are 
transmitted from the past, though not chosen by present generations, are still the product of action, 
labour and struggle of past generations. The reality that the present inherits from the past was in its 
turn human creation. Such concept of history stresses that the agency of human beings in history 
cannot be detached from a process of transmission. In addition, it poses the dilemma of what Eric 
Hobsbawm calls ‘the fundamental relationship between social being and consciousness.’14 Can class 
consciousness change history rather than just mirror it? Are the transmitted historical circumstances 
primarily an effect or a cause of human action and struggle? Rosa Luxemburg’s engagement with the 
events of her times led her to propose an intense exploration of these issues. 
 
2. Agency and Determination 
 
Michael Löwy and Norman Geras have focused on ‘The Crisis of German Social Democracy’ and 
have expressed diverging ideas on the notion of history that animates Luxemburg’s life and theory. It 
could be argued that Löwy’s and Geras’s standpoints in the debate might represent the two sides of 
Marx’s influential proposition, agency and determination, as they accentuate different aspects that are 
both present in Luxemburg’s thought. Michael Löwy emphasises the role of human action by 
dwelling on the importance of the subjective factor and an ‘open history,’ while Geras insists on 
objective historical conditions as key motivation for revolutionary intervention. Löwy and Geras 
centre their debate on the influential motto ‘socialism or barbarism,’ which Luxemburg re-phrased 
from Engels’s Anti-Dühring and further elaborated on in her ‘Junius Pamphlet.’ Commenting on the 
effects of the involvement of the German Social Democratic party in the war, Luxemburg states that 
‘bourgeois society stands at the crossroads, either transition to socialism or regression into barbarism’: 
‘regression into barbarism’ means the ‘triumph of imperialism’ and the ‘annihilation of civilisation’ 
through the world war.15 
Luxemburg’s rephrasing of Engels’s ‘either . . . socialism or . . . barbarism’ has become a battlecry in 
the socialist tradition. On a first, cursory reading, the phrase can be interpreted as an encouragement 
to fight against the violence of the imperialist war and to hinder the aggressive logic of capitalism. 
Yet, the exact meaning of this sentence has been object of intense discussion. One of the most 
sophisticated essays devoted to this passage is Michael Löwy’s 1971 seminal work ‘Rosa 
Luxemburg’s Conception of “Socialism or Barbarism”.’16 In his essay, Löwy provides a thoughtful 
analysis of Luxemburg’s concept of history, starting from the section from the ‘Junius Pamphlet’ 
quoted above. The starting point of Löwy’s reflection is the dilemma of whether socialism is ‘the 
inevitable and necessary product’ of historical development or ‘only a moral choice’.17 Löwy claims 
that the ‘Junius Pamphlet’ represented a radical break in Rosa Luxemburg’s life. Before the time of 
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the ‘Junius Pamphlet,’ Luxemburg’s writings showed traces of the predominant ‘fatalist’ idea of 
history that was widespread among the socialist intelligentsia in Germany, the notion that the collapse 
of capitalism was inevitable and that it would have automatically implied the rise of socialism.  
However, Löwy remarks that after the ‘catastrophe’ of 1914 Rosa Luxemburg became fully aware of 
the fact that the advent of socialism could not be taken for granted and that it was rather an aim to be 
achieved through constant struggle and political engagement. Löwy notes that Luxemburg’s key 
insight, in the Junius Pamphlet, is that history is not unilinear and there is no guarantee that socialism 
will be the outcome of the developments of capitalism.18 From this point of view, the role of the 
working class does not consist of a mere acceleration or shortening of a pre-determined historical 
process. In fact, the oppressed classes must decide the direction of history. Löwy elaborates on the 
wider theoretical and methodological significance of this radical conceptual break. He tracks 
Luxemburg’s reflection down to Engels’s Anti-Dühring, more specifically the passage in which 
Engels writes that ‘the productive forces created by the modern capitalist mode of production’ and 
‘the system of distribution of goods established by it’ are in a ‘crying contradiction’ with capitalism 
itself, to the extent that ‘if the whole of modern society is not to perish, a revolution in the mode of 
production and distribution must take place, a revolution which will put an end to all class 
distinctions.’19 
Engels emphasised that the conflicts and tensions produced by capitalism demanded a radical change 
in the system, hence a transition to socialism. But he still portrayed the transition to socialism as an 
almost automatic, necessary outcome produced by the contradictions of capitalism. In contrast to 
Engels, Rosa Luxemburg radically re-interpreted the meaning of the alternative between ‘socialism 
and barbarism’ in a non-deterministic and non-teleological way. Socialism is not a necessary 
development of the crisis of capitalism, but an alternative that needs to be realised, with urgency, 
through political intervention. The significance of this intellectual insight is, according to Löwy, the 
idea of an ‘open history,’ in which socialism is a possibility among others.20 He summarises the issue 
as follows: ‘with her famous slogan, socialism or barbarism, she [Luxemburg] broke, in the most 
radical possible way, with all deterministic teleologies, proclaiming the irreducible factor of 
contingency in the historical process—which makes possible a theory of history that finally 
acknowledges the role of the “subjective” factor.’21 
This is a concept of history in which the historical conditions of the present do not predetermine the 
course of history because history is an open battlefield constantly reshaped by political action. 
Michael Löwy hence remarks that the slogan ‘socialism or barbarism’ ‘implies a perception of history 
as an open process, a series of “bifurcations” in which the “subjective factor” of the oppressed – 
consciousness, organisation, initiative – becomes decisive.’22 The oppressed are not the victim of 
history, nor are they a mere instrument for the realisation of history’s laws. Löwy observes:  
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It is no longer a matter of waiting for the fruit to ‘ripen’ according to the ‘natural laws’ of 
economics or history, but of acting before it is too late. Because the other alternative is a 
sinister danger: barbarism. Rosa Luxemburg does not use this term to refer to an impossible 
‘regression’ to a tribal, primitive or ‘savage’ past; for her, it is an eminently modern 
barbarism.23 
 
The concept of an ‘open history’ inspired by Luxemburg leads Löwy to propose a ‘Marxism of 
unpredictability’ based on the view that ‘if history is open, if “the new” is possible, this is because the 
future is not known in advance; the future is not the ineluctable result of a given historical evolution, 
the necessary and predictable outcome of the “natural” laws of social transformation.’24 According to 
Löwy, a concept of ‘open history’ challenges ideas of history as natural, necessary and predictable, 
and becomes the precondition for political action. The unpredictability of the historical process re-
opens the present to a multiplicity of possibilities that can equally take place and hence to the ethical 
and political dimension of the struggle for social justice.  
However, Löwy’s interpretation has been questioned by another important heir of Luxemburg. In his 
analysis of the problem in The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg, Norman Geras also provides insightful 
reflections on Luxemburg’s concept of history, proposing a critique of Löwy’s perspective. The crux 
of the debate can be summarised by two open questions: the first concerns whether there is, in fact, a 
shift in Rosa Luxemburg’s conception before and after 1915, something that Löwy tries to 
demonstrate and that Geras doubts. The second problem, wider and more urgent for the purpose of 
this essay, is whether Luxemburg’s concept of history can be really seen as a critique of the idea of 
historical determinism, as Löwy proposes. Norman Geras argues that Rosa Luxemburg did not reject 
the concept of history as inevitable and, in a way, pre-determined, but it was precisely for this reason 
that she was able to pose a challenge to revisionism and to urge conscious political intervention 
against capitalist imperialism. Geras advances two critical points in relation to Löwy’s analysis. First 
of all, he objects to the claim that there is a break in Luxemburg’s concept of history after 1915. He 
writes: 
 
First: not a single one of the formulations and arguments cited by him [Löwy] as evidence of 
a fatalist temptation in Luxemburg’s thought before 1915 disappears from her writings after 
that date . . . the socialism-or-barbarism formula sits happily beside the argument that it is in 
the proletariat’s power ‘to accelerate or to retard’ historical development . . . Further, the 
theory of inevitable capitalist collapse . . . received extensive theoretical elaboration in The 
Accumulation of Capital in 1913, was vigorously defended against criticism in the Anti-
Critique in 1915, and was reaffirmed in the Introduction to Political Economy.25 
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Geras argues that there only is one concept of history in Luxemburg, a concept she defended in all of 
her writings, and which the crisis of 1914 only gave her the occasion to reinstate. There is no ‘fatalist’ 
temptation in Luxemburg’s early writings because the terms she adopted to describe history remained 
the same. However, since her earlier writing, Luxemburg’s views seem to pose an unsolvable doubt 
about her concept of history. In her 1900 essay ‘Reform or Revolution,’ Luxemburg notes that ‘it is 
not true that socialism will arise automatically from the daily struggle of the working class.’26 But this 
is the case because socialism will be the outcome of two factors: on the one hand, the ‘growing 
contradictions of capitalist economy’ and, on the other hand, ‘a social transformation’ provoked by 
the consciousness of the ‘unavoidability of the suppression of these contradictions.’27 This passage 
stresses the two sides of Luxemburg’s thought about history. Determination and agency, necessary 
breakdown and conscious human action are presented as two sides of the same historical process. In 
her 1900 essay, she affirms that socialism will not emerge automatically. Yet, political involvement is 
based on the consciousness that the destruction of capitalism through its contradictions is 
‘unavoidable.’ Even in her 1906 essay on the mass strike, guided by the imperative of the struggle for 
emancipation, there are passages suggesting that collective action is not artificially ‘made’ or 
‘decided’ but rather ‘it is a historical phenomenon which, at a given moment, results from social 
conditions with historical inevitability.’28 Luxemburg’s view seems to be that political actions need to 
occur, as Furio Jesi remarks, at the right time; they should neither be premature nor belated in relation 
to the historical situation.29 In this context, terms like ‘inevitability’ seem to contradict the idea of 
openness and unpredictability, hence to support Löwy’s view that, before 1915, Luxemburg’s work 
shows traces of fatalism and teleology. But Geras’s remarks point to an even more radical suggestion 
about Luxemburg’s perspective, calling into question the very opposition between the two concepts of 
history: a pre-1915 ‘fatalist’ concept of the inevitable collapse of capitalism and a post-1915 theory 
about the openness of history and multiple historical alternatives. According to Geras, these two ideas 
should not be opposed to each other because they are not in contradiction. Geras writes that the two 
ideas, ‘the idea of inevitable capitalist collapse’ and ‘the idea of socialism-or-barbarism . . . so far 
from being contradictory, are not even different. They are one and the same idea.’30  
The antinomy between fatalism and activism is, for Geras, a substantial misunderstanding of 
Luxemburg’s concept of history. It is worth noting, anyway, that he criticises Löwy in order to 
support an idea with which Löwy’s reflections are highly compatible: Luxemburg strongly opposed 
any passive or opportunist conception that the socialist revolution could have been postponed because 
it was to come anyway. For Löwy, Luxemburg’s challenge to fatalism depended on her awareness of 
an ‘open history,’ while for Geras, the antithesis to fatalism is represented by the historical necessity 
of capitalist breakdown. Geras’s critical gesture is based on a shift: whereas Löwy focuses his 
attention on the necessity of socialism, Geras reframes the discourse on the necessity of barbarism. 
Geras suggests that it is, precisely, the idea that capitalism leads inevitably to modern barbarism – 
hence an idea of historical determination, even teleology – that compels present generations to 
 8 
interrupt capitalism’s accelerating path towards catastrophe and to save humanity from the impending 
universal ruin. Geras writes: 
 
For Luxemburg, therefore, what the inevitability of capitalist collapse proves is not the 
redundancy, but the urgent indispensability, of conscious revolutionary struggle on the part of 
the working class. It is because of that inevitability, and not despite it, that such a struggle is 
required . . . The whole breakdown theory gives sense to the slogan ‘socialism or barbarism,’ 
distinguishing it from mere rhetoric; it is its meaning and not, as has so often been supposed, 
its negation.31 
 
It is not the idea of historical openness, but rather the historical inevitability of capitalist collapse that 
makes socialism urgent, hence motivates a politically conscious intervention of the oppressed classes. 
Geras’s perspective suggests that there is nothing contradictory between Luxemburg’s economic 
theory of the inevitable collapse of capitalism and her lifelong political commitment to prompting 
collective action.32 After the publication of Geras’s book, Michael Löwy replied to his criticism. He 
reiterated his thesis about the watershed in Luxemburg’s thought and the contradictory aspects of the 
concept of history informing her writings. In his reply to Geras, Löwy writes that Luxemburg’s 
assertion that ‘socialism is a  necessity for historical progress’ does not ‘remove the contradiction 
between the formula “socialism or barbarism,” which as Geras stresses points to “a genuine doubt,” 
and the thesis that the victory of socialism is inevitable.’33  
According to Löwy, there is an unresolved problem and contradiction in Luxemburg’s thought: 
history seems to be at the same time inevitable – necessary, predetermined, teleological – and open – 
contingent, unpredictable, subjective. In his reply to Geras, Löwy continues to approach the problem 
from the point of view of the unavoidable rise of socialism out of capitalism’s inner contradictions, 
rather than the historical inevitability of barbarism – that is, the thesis that if capitalism is left to its 
pure expansionist logic, it can only lead to total destruction. This is a problem, indeed, that cannot be 
explained away because the alternative between barbarism and socialism was never fully ‘solved’ by 
Rosa Luxemburg. Did Rosa Luxemburg think that socialism would be an inevitable consequence of 
the collapse of capitalism or did she envisage the possibility of socialism as one option only, 
dependent on social consciousness and action? The problem, as Norman Geras notes, remains how to 
affiliate Luxemburg’s clearly non-fatalist view of history with ‘the fact that Luxemburg did 
sometimes speak of revolutionary political initiatives as the mere accelerators of a unilinear process, 
of socialist revolution as simply the other face of capitalist collapse, of socialism as a historical 
necessity or inevitability.’34  
Rosa Luxemburg’s concept of history needs to be seen as posing the question, once again after Marx: 
how do human beings change an objective course of history that fully determines them as their 
material condition of existence? How to keep agency and determination – consciousness and the 
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social being – together? Löwy’s interpretation accentuates the role of human beings as makers of 
history, while Geras emphasises that historical change can only occur within a situation that has not 
been chosen but rather transmitted. Both perspectives detect core aspects of Luxemburg’s dialectical 
method; taken together, they articulate and reformulate a central question in historical materialism.35 
Löwy and Geras focused on Luxemburg’s ‘Junius Pamphlet’ and the phrase ‘socialism or barbarism,’ 
which are key to understanding these issues. However, Luxemburg’s contribution to historical 
materialism does not stop there. In her masterpiece, The Accumulation of Capital, she famously 
proposed the theory that capitalism inevitably leads to total destruction and universal ruin. Yet, she 
also examined capitalism’s historical conditions of existence and, most importantly, capitalism’s logic 
of reproduction. Her remarks on these issues indicate that the capitalist system radically transforms 
the meaning of historical categories. In particular, capitalism deeply affects the possibilities of agency 
and the very notion of historical determination. Her critique of this mechanism not only continues 
Marx’s method, but also urges a different historical consciousness based on the re-appropriation of the 
transmission of the past against capitalism’s spiral of perpetual violence and global expansion. 
 
3. Transmission and Reproduction 
 
In The Accumulation of Capital, Rosa Luxemburg addresses the mechanism of the reproduction of 
capitalism, posing the question of how capitalism perpetuates its expansionist logic and the inner 
contradictions of this process. After reading The Accumulation of Capital, the question about 
historical determination and the ‘subjective factor’ can be interpreted as concerning how historical 
capitalism has a bearing on the possibilities of action and the potential for socialism. The historical 
background out of which humans can create the socialist alternative is not natural or neutral, but 
already determined by capitalism as system in perpetual expansion. From this point of view, socialism 
will be not the automatic outcome of capitalism’s history; rather, the historical circumstances out of 
which socialism will (or will not) be created are necessarily determined by the expansion of 
capitalism. Indeed, capitalism does not only affect production, but also economic reproduction and 
historical transmission, the way in which human societies perpetuate themselves and create a sense of 
historical continuity.  
The Accumulation of Capital can be read as analysis of how capitalism manipulates the way in which 
historical transmission occurs, and Luxemburg makes a discovery in this regard: capitalism turns 
historical transmission into creation of value, that is, the reproduction of capital. She states this issue 
throughout her book, starting from the very introduction, in which she presents the question of 
reproduction as her main object of investigation.36 Luxemburg observes that reproduction means ‘the 
continual recurrence of the process of production’ and that ‘the regular repetition of reproduction is 
the general sine qua non of regular consumption which in its turn has been the precondition of human 
civilisation in every one of its historical forms.’37 The question of reproduction is the material 
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precondition for human history, and there can be no reproduction ‘unless certain prerequisites such as 
tools, raw materials and labour have been established during the preceding period of production.’38 
The central problem of The Accumulation of Capital concerns how capitalism radically transforms 
this general fact of reproduction. In this regard, capitalism entails a specificity, which is described as 
follows: 
 
Reproduction here [in a capitalist society] depends on purely social considerations: only those 
goods are produced which can with certainty be expected to sell, and not merely to sell, but to 
sell at the customary profit. Thus profit becomes an end in itself, the decisive factor which 
determines not only production but also reproduction.39 
 
Capitalism is the first social formation that submits the whole process of reproduction to the law of 
profit, which means: capitalism regulates production according to the need to create profit (surplus 
value) and to reinvest this profit in order to make further profit, in an endless, constantly expanding 
spiral. While in ‘every other economic system known to history, reproduction is determined by the 
unceasing need of society for consumer goods,’ profit-making (surplus value) is the central 
determining factor of historical capitalism.40 The dilemma between human agency and historical 
necessity needs to be placed within the expanding logic of accumulation. When capitalism is 
considered as a whole system affecting and ‘determining’ the individual experience of producers, this 
logic emerges in all its violence and virulence. Rosa Luxemburg writes: 
 
Under a system of private economy, it is the individual producer who determines the volume 
of reproduction at his discretion. His main incentive is appropriation of surplus value, indeed 
an appropriation increasing as rapidly as possible. An accelerated appropriation of surplus 
value, however, necessitates an increased production of capital to generate this surplus value . 
. .  the capitalist method of production furnishes not only a permanent incentive to 
reproduction in general, but also a motive for its expansion . . . Expansion becomes in truth a 
coercive law, an economic condition of existence for the individual capitalist.41 
 
This passage describes a radical transition: from incentive to appropriation, the logic of accumulation 
becomes law and necessity, and condition of existence. Reproduction turns into a motive for endless 
expansion, which becomes the underlying cause of each act of production and appropriation of 
surplus value. The activation of the spiral of accumulation entails a change in the perception of the 
overall process of reproduction: from a mere choice or possibility, the expansion of capitalism 
becomes a ‘necessity’ for the survival of the system, an enclosure from which there is no apparent 
escape. Luxemburg’s book, however, addresses reproduction in order to demonstrate the inner 
contradictions of accumulation. She shows that this logic results in inconsistency and that pure 
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capitalism, that is, a capitalist system considered as existing independently of other economic forms, 
cannot sustain itself and cannot but result in catastrophe. Luxemburg makes the point that capitalism 
on its own is incapable of realising the surplus value constantly produced. Pure capitalism cannot find 
ways to transform accumulated wealth into money that can be reinvested to expand production. This 
happens because whenever reproduction is ‘enlarged,’ that is, whenever accumulated capital is 
reinvested to create new profit, a new demand for the produced commodities needs to be found.42 Pure 
capitalism is founded on a coercive law of enlarged reproduction that cannot subsist without the 
continued existence of some other social formations: pre- or non-capitalist economies.  
The contradiction of capitalism derives from its need for other economic forms in order to reproduce a 
logic of total expansion that does not tolerate other forms alongside itself. The central theme of The 
Accumulation of Capital, hence, is the reproduction of capitalism as a system, and the unsolvable 
contradictions to which this form of reproduction gives birth. Luxemburg’s main argument concerns 
the realisation of surplus value and how this realisation is impossible in pure capitalism. However, the 
methodological part of Luxemburg’s work, the section titled ‘The Problem of Reproduction,’ reveals 
an historical factor affecting the very existence of capitalist society. Capitalism’s drive to expand 
depends on a precondition: the availability of means of production, tools and materials that can be 
expended and set to work in order to activate the mechanism of reproduction. This is a prerequisite of 
human history in general, because every economic form needs a storage of resources accumulated 
from preceding periods in order to subsist. But Rosa Luxemburg also explores the transformation that 
the hoarding of resources undergoes in a capitalist society. Means of production are subject to the 
same coercive law of enlarged reproduction that regulates everything in capitalism: the appropriation 
and realisation of surplus value. For this reason, tools and materials from preceding historical periods 
are fully absorbed in the process of the accumulation of capital: they become what Marx called 
‘constant capital.’43 This transformation shows how capitalism manipulates a universal factor of 
human existence, the handling down or transmission of material objects from one generation to the 
next. Luxemburg explains it as follows: 
 
The handling of man-made tools is a fundamental characteristic of human civilisation. The 
concept of past labour which precedes all new labour and prepares its basis, expresses the 
nexus between man and nature evolved in the history of civilisation. This is the eternal chain 
of closely interwoven labouring efforts of human society, the beginnings of which are lost in 
the grey dawn of the socialisation of mankind, and the termination of which would imply the 
end of the whole of civilised mankind. Therefore we have to picture all human labour as 
performed with the help of tools which themselves are already products of antecedent 
labour.44 
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The important insight presented by Rosa Luxemburg concerns her use of the term ‘past labour’ in 
order to depict this process of social transmission: past labour expresses the link between man and 
nature and the essential historical fact that human societies need to inherit materials conditions of 
existence from previous generations in order to survive and to be perpetuated. The very act of 
historical transmission is grasped by Luxemburg as handling-down of material tools and products of 
previous labour, resources out of which present generations literally ‘make’ the present, by resuming 
the productive process. The process of transmission allows Luxemburg to indicate that ‘every new 
product thus contains not only the new labour whereby it is given its final form, but also past labour 
which had supplied the materials for it, the instruments of labour and so forth.’45 Material historical 
circumstances that determine the present are products of past labour, or ‘antecedent labour,’ which the 
present revives and re-produces. 
In a capitalist society, this process of handling down and transmission of past labour is reformulated 
as the making of constant capital. Luxemburg notes that in capitalism, past labour assumes a double 
aspect: on the one hand it becomes use-value, a concrete means of production that serves the making 
of commodities. On the other hand, it becomes ‘abstract, general, socially necessary labour and as 
such creates value . . . this past labour, too, now appears as value, as old value.’46 Past labour becomes 
capital and hence value; it is fully incorporated in the enlarged reproduction of capitalism and 
submitted to the coercive law of accumulation. The fact that this ‘old value’ or constant capital is in 
truth the product of labour transmitted from the past is in fact forgotten and erased from the process of 
the accumulation of capital. This is an insight that Marx had mentioned in the first volume of Capital, 
where he famously described labour as a ‘metabolism’ between humans and nature.47 The image of 
metabolism or ‘digestion’ was partly introduced to explain the fact that, whenever products of labour 
enter the process of production, they lose their nature as products of human labour and become mere 
resources, ‘objective factors contributing to living labour.’48 Marx explains: 
 
A spinner treats spindles only as a means for spinning, and flax as the material he spins. Of 
course it is impossible to spin without material and spindles . . . But in the process itself, the 
fact that they are the products of past labour is as irrelevant as, in the case of the digestive 
process, the fact that bread is the product of the previous labour of the farmer, the miller and 
the baker . . . In a successful product, the role played by past labour in mediating its useful 
properties has been extinguished.49 
 
The first point made by Luxemburg in her commentary on Marx’s concept of reproduction involves 
retrieving the past labour extinguished in constant capital. Luxemburg observes that when ‘we go 
back to to that period of production, when the total fixed capital was first created,’ Marx’s notion of 
constant capital appears ‘unsatisfactory or incomplete.’50 Luxemburg suggests that society ‘possesses 
transformed labour amounting to more than those parts of fixed capital which are absorbed into the 
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value of the annual product.’51 In her comments on the notion of ‘simple reproduction,’ Luxemburg 
notes that capitalism involves turning past labour into value captured by the logic of accumulation. 
Luxemburg recovers this elemental aspect, which plays a fundamental role in her attempt to show that 
capitalist reproduction needs other times, spaces, and social formations in order to persevere and to 
expand.52 In her critique of Marx’s concept of ‘simple reproduction,’ Luxemburg writes: 
 
Under capitalist methods of production past labour of society preserved in the means of 
production takes the form of capital, and the question of the origin of this past labour which 
forms the foundation of the reproductive process becomes the question of the genesis of 
capital. This is . . . writ in letters of blood in modern history.53  
 
Past labour is the foundation of the reproductive process and the ‘genesis of capital,’ a genesis that 
links reproduction to a wider process of historical transmission of labour that exceeds capitalism and 
that the latter merely appropriates and distorts. Means of production preserve a storage of past labour 
that capitalism disguises as constant capital. The sense of historical determination engendered by 
capitalism is affected by the process of reproduction and its drive to extinguish past labour into the 
making of constant capital. It is this forgetfulness and this erasure that allows the process of 
accumulation to appear as a coercive law guiding the entire process, while its genesis in the 
appropriation of past labour is constantly obliterated. The concept of past labour is mentioned by 
Luxemburg in order to grasp ‘the social process as perpetually in motion, as a link in the endless chain 
of events’ and to show that the history of labour exceeds what Marx called ‘simple reproduction’: 
social labour ‘has no beginning, just as it has no end.’54 Luxemburg indicates that economic 
reproduction is the incessant formation and expansion of capital through the appropriation of 
resources produced by old value or the hoard of past labour disguised in materials of production. The 
illusion that capital is the cause and guide of the whole process depends on the constant erasure of 
traces of past accumulated labour from constant capital and on taking constant capital as the 
beginning of reproduction. Luxemburg’s critique of capitalism demonstrates that the condition of 
existence of capitalism is the appropriation and commodification of the human ability to transmit 
products of labour across generations of producers.  
 
4. Conclusion: The Labour of History 
 
Rosa Luxemburg’s critique of capitalism’s logic of reproduction has two implications for thinking the 
concept of history. First, it involves the consciousness that capitalism is an historically contingent  
phenomenon, a system that feeds on exterior material conditions of existence and that, for this reason, 
is ‘immanently incapable of becoming a universal form of production.’55 However, the consciousness 
of capitalism’s historicity and perishability entails a second implication. Capitalism’s reproduction 
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depends on the commodification of the products of past labour – tools, resources, materials – and on 
the erasure of the historical traces of antecedent labour preserved in them. It follows that the 
possibility of constructing an alternative to capitalism needs to re-appropriate the process of historical 
transmission that capital disguises as value. The socialist alternative can only begin by repossessing 
the conditions of transmission of the past into the present. The spiral of reproduction can only be 
interrupted by keeping the traces of past labour alive, an act that involves thinking history otherwise 
and assuming the present as product of human action. In this sense, Luxemburg shows that, in a 
capitalist system, historical determination is the result of appropriation: the material conditions of 
existence are not transmitted as product of past labour but inserted into the labour-process as constant 
capital. 
A concept of history based on the critique of the logic of reproduction exhibits the need to reclaim 
material conditions of existence as a continuous history of labour and of struggle. This perspective 
reveals the deeper meaning of Luxemburg’s later remarks that the socialist future will not emerge 
automatically but can only be created from the ‘material conditions that have been built up by past 
development.’56 From this point of view, Luxemburg’s emphasis on the problem of reproduction 
anticipates the idea that socialism ‘will not fall as manna from heaven’ but it can only take place ‘by a 
long chain of powerful struggles, in which the proletariat . . . will learn to take hold of the rudder of 
society to become instead of the powerless victim of history, its conscious guide.’57 The point does 
not concern so much whether the subjective or objective factor is primary, but the ability to develop 
an historical consciousness that places the struggles of the present in contact with the ‘long chain’ of 
past struggles and the ‘endless chain’ of social labour that capital constantly appropriates. The 
possibility of socialism derives, for Luxemburg, from this other historical time and this different view 
of history, in which the present inherits past labour and takes it forward, guiding the process of 
historical transmission and resisting capitalism’s manipulations of time. 
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